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PREFACE and ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This Occasional Paper originates in a conference, 'Confronting the Future in 
Argentina: the second Menem administration', held by the Institute of Latin 
American Studies on 1-2 February, 1996. The conference addressed a 
number of large themes, namely: political institution-building; financial and 
economic reform; the social impact of structural adjustment; foreign trade; 
and international relations. Papers presented at the international relations 
panel are published here, in advance of other contributions which are being 
included in a volume of conference proceedings which will appear later in the 
year. 
The decision to reproduce contributions on international relations 
separately and in advance was taken for a number of reasons. First, because 
of the immediacy of several of the issues raised by speakers. Secondly, 
because the importance of some recent initiatives, which are highlighted in 
the papers that follow, has been insufficiently acknowledged. Thirdly, as was 
observed by many at the conference, the momentum of progress in British-
Argentine diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem of the islands appears to 
have faded somewhat. 
This publication, which cautions against complacency, emphasises the 
significance of new policy developments on the Argentine side. It draws 
attention to the achievements of previous efforts to strengthen British-
Argentine relations, detailing important areas of co-operation in the South 
Atlantic. It stresses the importance of establishing a firm but flexible 
timetable for further progress. 
We wish to acknowledge the help of Andrew Hurrell, Nuffield College, 
Oxford, in the preparation of this Occasional Paper. At the conference he 
served as the discussant for the International Relations Panel and has 
generously allowed us access to his comments on the papers. This material 
has been incorporated in the Introduction. 
Note: In the papers reproduced here, the names Malvinas, Islas Malvinas, 
Falklands and Falkland Islands are used according to the preference of the 
authors, corresponding generally to Spanish vs. English linguistic usage. 
Colin M. Lewis and Celia Szusterman 
CONTRIBUTORS 
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joining the Peronist party. He was elected national deputy for Mendoza in 
1985, and governor of the province from 1987-91. In 1994, after being 
elected Senator for Mendoza, he left the Peronists to form a new party, 
PAIS, which joined the centre-left coalition Frente Grande. While in the 
national congress, he served as chairman of the foreign affairs committee. He 
contested the 1995 presidential elections as the candidate for the newly 
formed FREPASO (Frente del Pais Solidario), coming second with 30 per 
cent of the vote. In February 1996 he resigned from FREPASO and in March 
he resigned his seat in the Senate. 
Alastair Elliott Forsyth was born in 1932 in Hong Kong. He was educated 
in the UK and took his degree at Keble College, Oxford University. After 
some years in industry (United Steel Companies and the General Electric 
Company), he joined the London merchant bank J. Henry Schroder Wagg & 
Co. Ltd in 1971. From 1976 to 1982 he lived in Caracas as the regional 
representative for the Schroder Group. He was appointed a director of J. 
Henry Schroder Wagg in 1982, and in 1984 was made Director responsible 
for Latin America. In 1992 he retired as a director of Schroders and 
established his own advisory company, Consultores Asociados Sur 
Americanos (C.A.S.A.), specialising in financial aspects of Latin American 
development. He has continued as an adviser to Schroders since 1992. He is 
currently chairman of the Anglo-Colombian Society, vice-chairman of the 
Argentine-British Conference and secretary of the South Atlantic Council. 
INTRODUCTION 
COLIN M. LEWIS and CELIA SZUSTERMAN 
Argentina used to be a country that never ceased to amaze. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, observers commentated admiringly about economic 
prosperity and progress. For much of the present century, gloom and despair 
seemed to prevail. Today, reasons for optimism are strong enough to warrant 
the view that Argentina is once again a country with a future, not merely a 
country with a brilliant future behind it. The remarkable changes that have 
produced this transformation had their origins in the return of democracy in 
1983. At that time, the priority of the Alfonsin administration (1983-89) was 
institution-building. Inevitably, the focus of these efforts was largely 
domestic and political. The Radical administration also attached a high 
priority to promoting economic recovery and the re-establishment of good 
diplomatic relations, not least with neighbouring countries. Efforts were also 
made to normalise relations with the United Kingdom. As contributions 
below confirm, by the end of the Alfonsfn presidency, there had been several 
foreign policy advances. Friendly relations had been restored with Chile 
following a peaceful resolution of border problems. A free trade agreement 
with Brazil had been negotiated and would be expanded to include other 
countries. In world fora, Argentina worked consistently in defence of human 
rights and sought to co-operate with international agencies and other 
countries to resolve problems arising from the debt crisis. 
Considerable achievements on a number of issues did not, however, signal 
the formulation of a new foreign policy as Argentina attempted to re-define 
its role in the Americas and assess its position in the wider world. Attitudes 
to the United States remained ambivalent, showing no significant departure 
from a tradition of misunderstanding which had come to a head again at the 
time of the war between Britain and Argentina in the South Atlantic in 1982. 
This had led many academics and foreign policy practitioners both in the 
USA and Argentina to believe that there was some intrinsic impediment to the 
two countries ever establishing good relations, based on co-operation rather 
than confrontation. As far as the UK was concerned, an unavoidable coldness 
resulting from the 1982 conflict increased the inability or the unwillingness 
of both countries to devise a formula for constructive contacts. Indeed, full 
diplomatic relations were not re-established until 1990. 
This situation changed markedly after 1989. Possibly recognising that 
foreign policy during the Alfonsin period had been too much driven by 
events, the in-coming Peronist government determined to formulate a new 
foreign policy that was both internally coherent and consistent with policy 
shifts in other areas. President Menem's government saw the opportunity for 
a new pragmatism. This pragmatism, acknowledging that historical 
confrontation with the USA had been prejudicial to Argentine national 
interest, was none the less accompanied by a strong and explicit ideological 
commitment to Western values of liberal democracy and free-market 
economics. 
The conference speeches reproduced in this Occasional Paper stress the 
importance of the new approach to foreign relations. Policy directions since 
the mid-1980s, and particularly since 1989, represent a fundamental break 
with positions held from the 1950s to the 1980s. Implicitly and explicitly the 
papers suggest the formation of a new domestic consensus about the global 
community - and Argentina's place in it - following the collapse of 
communism. The contributions also point to the relationship between 
economic recovery and the new internationalism that underpins foreign 
policy. Closer economic relations with neighbouring countries and rapidly 
expanding commercial and financial contacts beyond the region present both 
challenges and opportunities for policy-makers. Argentina is attempting to 
provide the political basis for increased confidence on the part of the 
international financial and business community. Closer engagement with the 
international economy initially provided a favourable context for advances in 
bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. The accelerating pace of global 
integration also drives Argentine efforts for a final resolution of the dispute 
with Britain and explains frustration at the recent failure to build further on 
the progress of the early 1990s. While for Britain the issue of 'the islands' 
was 'resolved' in 1982, for Argentina it was not. The territorial claim over 
the islands is a constitutive element of Argentine 'national' identity. This for 
Argentina is 'the Malvinas factor', and one that has to be reckoned with in 
domestic and international politics. In the wider world, new meanings of 
sovereignty are emerging with the process of regional integration and the 
formation of trading blocs such as the European Union (EU) and 
MERCOSUR. These developments may provide the basis for discussing 
parcelled out sovereignty and multi-level governance. 
In the immediate future the main challenge facing Argentina will be the 
interplay between ideological conviction - the commitment to liberal, market 
capitalism - and pragmatic responses to global opportunities. In this respect, 
symbolic gestures such as participation in United Nations peace-keeping 
efforts may not be enough. Argentine citizens expect tangible economic 
benefits from such policies, benefits which the government has promised will 
result from the politics of multilateralism. But Argentina is engaged in an 
asymmetrical relationship with the USA and also with Brazil. Will the 
Menem administration be able to sustain the balance between pragmatism and 
ideology v/ithout re-creating in Washington the ill-feeling that too often 
characterised past relations? The decision to send two corvettes to the Gulf 
war and to participate in the blockade of Haiti, which signalled a dramatic 
change in Argentine foreign policy, served well enough in an era of political 
multilateralism when the United Nations performed the role of global police 
force. Will these conditions continue? An espousal of Western values is no 
guarantee of good relations with Washington which has its own agenda and 
a record of selective and inconsistent engagement with the continent. 
Relations with Brazil are critical. Much has been achieved, and in a shorter 
period than many observers thought possible three years ago. Argentines 
have been remarkably quick in dismissing traditional rivalries with their 
powerful neighbour, but the new partnership reflected in MERCOSUR should 
not obscure areas of potential conflict. These relate to differences of 
approach over commercial integration in the Americas and Brazilian attitudes 
to increased regional institutionalisation. Buenos Aires and Brasilia do not 
have the same view about the most appropriate form of relationship with 
NAFTA. To date MERCOSUR has prided itself on a relatively low level of 
institutionalisation and the flexibility that this allows, but Argentina and the 
other partners favour the implementation of mechanisms to prevent 
hegemonic dominance by the largest member. Is Brazil willing to move in 
this direction of increased institutionalisation and, if not, how will 
MERCOSUR resolve conflicts large and small that must lie ahead? 
To summarise, all contributions stress the profound changes that have 
occurred in Argentine domestic economic and foreign policy since 1989. 
They also demonstrate and celebrate the bi- (possibly multi-) partisan nature 
of some of these changes and the increasing congruence of domestic and 
external policy objectives. With the return of democracy and successive 
democratic renewals of government, Argentina is portrayed as once again a 
thoroughly 'western' society whose foreign relations are determined by 
pragmatic self-interest within a framework of global and regional co-
operation. Regional issues are presented in optimistic terms, convergence and 
economic rationality being the principal descriptions of contacts with the 
USA and neighbouring countries. 
In terms of British-Argentine relations, all papers emphasise important 
shifts in Argentine approaches, although there has been no weakening of her 
determination to press claims to sovereignty over the islands. In this respect, 
it is crucial to note that Argentina has forsworn the use of force in pursuit of 
those claims - the rejection of the military option is enshrined in the new 
Constitution of 1994. The three papers also warn against inertia, particularly 
on the British side, and dangers inherent in the failure to sustain progress on 
bi-lateral topics, as recent events in the South Georgias revealed. This means 
confronting the issue of sovereignty. Britain's refusal to acknowledge that 
sovereignty is a 'problem' is a problem in itself. For Argentina, 
strengthening commercial and financial relations with Britain is a means to 
an end: unavoidably leading to discussions about sovereignty. For Britain, 
closer economic links are the endgame and a way of permanently avoiding the 
discussion of sovereignty. Business Britain is well informed about the 
substance of institutional changes that have occurred in the economy and 
Argentine external economic relations since the 1980s, but does official 
Britain recognise fully the extent to which the Argentine agenda and attitudes 
have moved? A wider public debate is essential. Government and other 
agencies in the United Kingdom, Argentina and the Islands should play a 
more active role in promoting an informed discussion of the problem, 
ensuring that the position of all parties is acknowledged and, hopefully, 
understood. 
FOREIGN POLICY AND ARGENTINA'S NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
ANDRES CISNEROS 
This paper analyses Argentine foreign policy. It will show that since the 
return to democracy in 1983, first with the Alfonsin presidency and now with 
the Menem administration, policy has been consistent with an informed 
analysis of the new international scene and with profound domestic changes 
deriving from the decision of the people to embrace constitutional 
government. 
It is well known that Argentine institutions, established in the nineteenth 
century, were based on liberal democracy and a capitalist economy centred 
on agricultural exports. This system allowed the dominant land-owning elite 
to govern without extending political participation either to the growing 
middle classes or, even less so, lower sectors of society. It was an 
arrangement that contradicted the liberal values enshrined in the National 
Constitution of 1853 and the trend towards democracy that characterised the 
American continent. Nevertheless, by 1916 remarkable economic growth 
allowed political participation to widen. In that year sectors of the middle 
class, represented by the Union Civica Radical (the Radical Party), gained 
the presidency. Later, after 1945, the lower classes who were represented by 
the Justicialista (Peronist) movement struggled to be part of the political 
system. Throughout this period the economy was dominated by agriculture 
and the mainstay of foreign policy was the special relationship with Great 
Britain, the country's major commercial partner. 
The Collapse of Democracy and the Disintegration of Foreign Policy 
Consensus 
The process of democratic expansion was halted by the 1930 crisis, which 
had a profound impact on Argentina, and was only resumed in 1945 when the 
lower sectors, represented by the Peronist movement, struggled to become 
an active part of the political system. With few exceptions, between 1930 and 
1983, politics in Argentina was typified by instability and military coups 
d'etat. In clear violation of Western values, it was argued in some quarters 
that 'widening the political system meant ungovernability'. In addition, the 
1930 crisis, followed by the Second World War, brought to an end the special 
relationship with Great Britain. From then on Argentina found it impossible 
to frame a project for the country's relationship with the world that could 
command a consensus among the main political forces: Radicalism, Peronism 
and conservatism, then represented by the armed forces. 
This domestic context explains the apparent lack of consistency in Argentine 
foreign policy during the past four decades. Distinct, period-specific political 
arrangements account for sharp swings in policy. The world polarisation 
which resulted from the Cold War allowed the conservative sector to restrict 
political freedoms dramatically, under the guise of an anti-totalitarian 
struggle imbued with allusions to dark international conspiracies. Military 
regimes in Argentina, as in other Latin American countries, implemented 
policies based on the so-called 'West Point Doctrine' and on the notion of 
'ideological frontiers'. In reaction, Latin American popular movements, 
many of which were struggling for greater popular participation in the 
political system, started to conflate local totalitarian regimes and 'Western 
values' and rejected both. Consequently, many of these movements became 
openly anticapitalist and voiced support for, or aligned themselves with, 
countries in Africa and Asia united by the struggle against colonialism. Thus 
Argentine foreign policy oscillated between narrow alignment with the West 
and vociferous 'anti-imperialism'. This confused those who could not 
understand the extent to which foreign policy was driven by changing phases 
of domestic politics. 
In this scenario, and given its long, proven commitment to democracy, the 
Radical Party was not considered 'dangerous'. In contrast, the Justicialista 
movement looked distinctly suspicious. In the world of the 1940s, almost 
irrespective of individual circumstances, any mass movement was viewed as 
a vehicle for undemocratic or anticapitalist ideologies such as fascism and 
communism. Only today, fifty years after its creation, is the Justicialista 
movement finally able to demonstrate its great historic role, namely that it is 
perfectly possible to call on millions of poor and exploited people, not with 
the aim of abolishing the capitalist system of production or the democratic 
system of government, but to become part of both and thereby strengthen 
them. In this respect, it may be observed that marxist political parties are 
weak in Argentina precisely because of the impressive expansion of 
Peronism. 
Not until 1983 was it finally recognised that Justicialismo did not pose a 
challenge to the capitalist system of production, the democratic system of 
government and Western values, which are the three pillars on which the 
governability of the global system is now based. This recognition removes the 
threat of future military coups in Argentina as is confirmed by recent political 
history. The Argentine armed forces are now fully devoted to their 
professional tasks, developing their skills as evidenced in the unprecedented 
participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations. The country has 
enjoyed thirteen years of free elections and constitutional rule at local, 
provincial and national level. Few developing countries can boast such a fully 
articulated political system in which no social sector is denied political 
participation. These conditions have generated the consensus necessary for 
the application of the new economic model based on international economic 
reinsertion, a programme that requires more than one presidential term of 
office for its full development. Even those opposing the present government 
support this model although, hardly surprising, they maintain that they would 
have done better. 
Inflation and Foreign Policy 
It is not a coincidence that the most serious battle (and to date the most 
successful) against inflation is being led by a Justicialista government. 
Hitherto, and notwithstanding promises to promote wage and salary 
increases, inflation was employed as a perverse mechanism to transfer 
resources from wage-earners to the wealthiest sectors of society. Similar 
transfers resulted from generalised state intervention in the economy. For 
example, while the early Peronist governments of 1945-55 embarked on a 
process of nationalisation in order to provide low-priced social services for 
the mass of the population, when conservative groups regained power they 
used the enlarged state sector to generate a monstrous public debt. 
Between the 1940s and the 1980s domestic politics may be characterised 
as a battle for control of state enterprises. These were sometimes used as 
distributionist mechanisms (low-priced utilities, free services, employment 
for millions of people) and on other occasions to transfer wealth to business 
sectors through the awarding of extremely profitable contracts with the state. 
The activities of state-owned companies became an important instrument of 
macroeconomic management but, whether managed for the benefit of the 
business sector or to favour lower classes, these firms were inefficient. They 
generated huge losses and were an important cause of inflation. The growth 
of the state sector also contributed to the economic isolation of the country. 
Despite changes of government, the 'corporate state' continued to grow. 
An inefficient state may only be financed by inflation. This fostered a non-
competitive economy, unable to earn its way in the world, and a feeling of 
seclusion that generated in all sectors mistrust towards the outside world. 
These sentiments were reinforced by a false sense of economic self-
sufficiency which encouraged the country to turn its back on the world. The 
culture of inflation and state control in domestic matters led to a mood of 
isolation and confrontation in foreign affairs. These were features that 
dominated the strategies of different governments for almost half a century, 
be they popular or anti-popular. Hence, the world slowly began to forget our 
existence. 
Throughout this period different foreign policy strategies endeavoured to 
find a beneficial reinsertion in the world, after the loss of the privileged 
relationship with Great Britain. However, this was also a period in which 
consecutive US governments showed a notable, even absurd, hostility 
towards Argentina. This placed a major obstacle in our path. 
A new consistency between domestic and foreign policy is now being 
promoted, namely, anti-inflation and privatisation and a renewed opening of 
the economy. This is not an accidental relationship and it is one that attracts 
international attention. Once more, the characteristics of the domestic 
political situation are setting the guidelines for foreign policy. 
Three Crises and a New Era 
Within this framework of interaction between domestic and foreign policy 
issues, no politician could suggest proposals contrary to the premise of 
confrontation on which Argentine foreign policy operated. To have done so 
would have been to risk exclusion by a political competitor. The country was 
thus trapped in a vicious circle leading to catastrophe, a catastrophe that was 
manifest on three different fronts. 
On the political front, it was the so-called 'dirty war', a recourse to open 
violence in place of debate and a complete disregard for human rights. It was 
from this dark period that there finally emerged a new commitment to 
democracy. Elected in 1983, Raul Alfonsin became the first president this 
century to be succeeded by another civilian president, also freely elected, 
from a different party. The year 1989 witnessed the first democratic 
alternation of parties in power when Carlos Saul Menem succeeded to the 
presidency. Alfonsin and Menem, so distant in some other policy areas, gave 
a common priority to the issue of human rights. This is another element 
which promises to provide the basis for an incipient, if as yet tacit, bi-
partisan approach to foreign policy. 
On the economic front, hyperinflation, which reached a peak of 
approximately 200 per cent a month in 1988/89, administered a shock to the 
productive system and cemented support for the programme to reduce 
government intervention in the economy. If Argentines said 'never again' to 
the use of violence, they also said 'never again' to inflation. From this 
emerged a consensus in favour of privatisation and a competitive reinsertion 
in the world economy, beginning with economic integration with 
neighbouring countries. Despite some disagreement, and the belief of the 
opposition that they could have handled it better, this is another area of 
emerging bi-partisan agreement. 
On the international front, the crisis was brought about by the Malvinas 
defeat. There was a growing awareness that this resulted from an isolation 
from international reality, with its false assumptions about world reaction. 
Hence, and without waiving our rights to the Malvinas, we have said 'never 
again' to the use of force to recover sovereignty over them. Indeed, the First 
Temporary Provision of the new 1994 National Constitution precludes the use 
of force to recover sovereignty. 
The Foreign Policy of President Menem: regional and global dimensions 
These events, directly related to key decisions on the domestic front, 
heralded a new era in foreign relations. Acknowledging that some new 
policies such as the creation of MERCOSUR and the settlement of border 
disputes with Chile were initiated by the 1983-89 Radical government, the 
main decisions taken during the Menem administration are as follows: 
We have made progress in our efforts at economic integration with other 
countries. An open and competitive national economy requires greater 
scope for action than our domestic market permits. 
We have given up the production of missiles and other atomic, chemical 
and bacteriological weapons. This is a logical consequence of 
considering our neighbours as partners and not as potential areas of 
conflict. 
We are actively participating in United Nations peace-keeping efforts. 
We see this as a major and continuing area of operations for the armed 
forces since we no longer consider our neighbours as potential enemies. 
Finally, as to the global political scene, we are determined to be a part 
of the Western Alliance. This does not imply, as alleged by some of our 
critics, a submission to foreign powers. That would be not only shameful 
but detrimental to our national interests. Rather, as any impartial 
analysis of Argentine history over the last century will confirm, good 
relations with foreign countries contribute to national security and 
economic prosperity and thus best serve the interests of the nation. 
We have joined the Western Alliance not only because those countries have 
the same value system, the same political system and the same production 
system as ourselves, but because this association constitutes the natural 
environment for our economic growth and cultural development. These goals 
will be achieved by increasing our prestige and reliability through peaceful 
coexistence. In specific matters on which we may, and sometimes do, have 
a clash of interest with powerful countries, solutions are better achieved 
through negotiation rather than by hostile rhetoric. 
Thus the national programme of President Menem is based on a new 
correspondence between domestic and foreign policies: the fundamental 
instruments are economic modernisation and successful insertion in the world 
economy. Renewed alignment with Western countries has brought an 
essential benefit for our country - international reliability. This alignment 
stems from our understanding that, after the end of the Cold War, the foreign 
policy of every country would be mainly defined by its relationship with the 
United States of America. 
International security is decisive. Consequently, Argentina has chosen to 
become a full member of the Western Alliance. The commitment to our new 
foreign policy is evidenced by our contributions during the Gulf War and the 
blockade against the military government in Haiti. Other instances may be 
less well known, but are even more profound, namely signature of the 
Tlatelolco Treaty and subsequent accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the decision to cease production of weapons of mass destruction and 
the approval of legislation granting transparency and visibility to the purchase 
or sale of sensitive material, particularly nuclear technology. 
The strategic re-alignment in foreign policy has been accompanied by an 
active participation in the process of economic globalisation, an integration 
that Argentina has chosen to effect through MERCOSUR. Two years ago, 
when the four signatories of the Treaty of Asuncion (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay) were due to complete another stage in regional 
integration, there was intense discussion within each of the countries. In the 
case of Argentina, many sectors favoured following the example of Mexico 
and negotiating - either alone or with Chile - entry into the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the time the unpredictable situation in 
Brazil, signalled by high inflation and imminent presidential elections, 
appeared to threaten the future of MERCOSUR. Nevertheless, in association 
with the opposition, the government decided to demonstrate confidence in 
Brazil by ratifying the treaty. Today, the domestic trade benefits deriving 
from MERCOSUR are obvious. Moreover, as the 1995 Madrid Agreement 
between the European Union (EU) and MERCOSUR demonstrates, regional 
economic integration is not a barrier to global integration. The formation of 
a free-trade zone embracing MERCOSUR and the EU would result in the 
largest trading bloc in the whole world. 
Argentine confidence in the economic recovery of Brazil and in the wisdom 
of Brazilian voters and Brazilian political and business sectors was neither 
misplaced nor accidental. A thorough process of convergence between 
Argentina and Brazil is under way. This is reflected, for example, in a recent 
declaration by President Cardoso that the main global partner of Brazil is the 
USA and the main regional partner is Argentina. These sentiments parallel 
those that have guided Argentine foreign policy since 1989. 
The Menem administration is convinced that economic decline since the 
Second World War can be explained by two factors which result directly 
from the foreign policy implemented. First, maintaining a closed economy. 
Secondly, pursuing apparently prestigious goals such as the production of 
submarines, tanks or missiles and the development of advanced technologies 
which we were unable to use in mass production for export. This approach 
was accompanied by a policy of confrontation with the USA. 
By 1989, the degree of antagonism towards the USA was illustrated by 
Argentine voting patterns in the United Nations. Of the 158 countries voting 
at the UN, only Cuba, Yemen and the Sudan voted against the USA more 
often than Argentina. Indeed, Argentina's voting pattern was similar to 
Vietnam's. Even countries like Iraq and Libya voted with the USA more 
often than Argentina. It was as if there was an automatic 'dis-alignment' with 
the USA. This has changed. The Argentine voting pattern is now similar to 
that of Spain or Italy, namely a 30 to 40 percent coincidence with the USA. 
However, this does not mean an 'automatic alignment' with the USA, as has 
been alleged. On the contrary, unlike Britain, we frequently vote in 
disagreement with the USA. Our voting pattern is decided on the basis of 
what we consider to be our national interest and not on the basis of 
consistency with the vote of third countries, whatever their power or 
friendliness towards us. We understand that a true definition of Argentine 
national interest does not entail any kind of systematic hostility. 
Antagonism to the USA comes from our past. In the nineteenth century 
Argentina thought it could develop to have an importance in the world similar 
to the USA. The failure of this aspiration led us to oppose US policies in the 
region and to other hostile attitudes, as reflected in an active participation in 
the Non-Aligned Movement and in support for North-South confrontation. 
This unfriendliness was reciprocal. For long periods the USA supported 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America with the result that to side with the 
West in general or with the USA in particular meant to be identified with 
governments responsible for the destruction of democracy and the systematic 
violation of human rights. These de facto governments purported to uphold 
the values of the West and thereby convinced countries of the Western 
Alliance of the need to tolerate such violations. 
Since 1989 the maintenance of good relations with the USA has been a 
basic tenet of Argentine foreign policy. I believe that the government of 
President Alfonsin sought the same goal. We back a functional alignment that 
fosters economic development and the flow of credit and investment. 
Negotiation is required only in cases where US activities impinge on 
Argentine interests. 
The nature of the change in security policy should not be underestimated. 
If we are now sending ships to the Gulf or the Haiti blockade, only a few 
years ago we had refused to accept a negative verdict in the final arbitration 
over the border with Chile. Between 1976 and 1983 we went through a 'dirty 
war' with thousands dead and 'disappeared'. In 1982 we started a war in the 
Malvinas. We developed space missile technology in co-operation with Iraq. 
We refused to allow controls and safeguards to be applied in our nuclear 
undertakings nor would we guarantee their peaceful use. With such a 
background, Argentina was considered at best a destabilising factor in the 
region and, consequently, as a risky country whose economic development 
was not worthy of support. 
Our national interest demanded a major change of policy to combat this 
negative image. A new approach was needed to promote economic and social 
development. We were a weak peripheral country, with record levels of 
inflation, an enormous debt and a closed economy with one of the lowest 
ratios of export to GDP in the world. As regards domestic matters, an 
important reduction of the military expenditure means budget savings and 
reflects a change of attitude towards our neighbours whom we now regard as 
partners in co-operation. We share borders with five countries. Three -
Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay - are members of MERCOSUR. Another, 
Bolivia, is in the process of joining as is Chile. With Chile we have set a 
historic record as regards trade and investment and are embarked on a 
negotiated settlement to border disputes. Argentina and Chile share the third 
or fourth longest frontier in the world and in the last ten years have solved 23 
of the 24 border disputes identified. 
In foreign affairs, Argentina's military participation in Peace-keeping 
Forces has followed strictly the requirements of the United Nations Security 
Council - so much so that we provide more than one half of the 3,100 Latin 
American soldiers serving with the UN. This is not to claim a leadership role 
for the country, but simply to point out our new position which is respected, 
and being emulated, by other countries. 
Argentina has always had a less conflict-ridden relationship with Europe 
than with the USA. This may explain why we focused our attention less on 
that continent at a time when the first priority was to mend those relations 
that had been most damaged by almost a century of unrelenting hostility, 
namely Argentine-US relations. When constitutional government was 
restored in 1983, Europe hailed our return to democracy and applauded the 
remarkable efforts made by the Alfonsin government in the defence of human 
rights. Unfortunately, neither European political approval nor the long 
history of Argentine-European good relations were reflected in credit, 
investment and significant economic support. Europe assisted Argentina 
along the democratic path by encouraging at least two further elements 
essential for democracy - economic stability and the positive view of 
international credit organisations. 
Today, seven years after the beginning of the first Menem administration, 
we have achieved economic stability, a Brady plan is in place, and we have 
the support of the International Monetary Fund and similar agencies. The fact 
that we have signed an unprecedented inter-regional framework agreement 
between the European Union and MERCOSUR is not pure serendipity. On 
the contrary, the agreement marks the changes that have already occurred in 
Argentina and are now underway in Brazil. 
Relations between Great Britain and Argentina 
A few words about our relationship with Great Britain. It is important to 
remember that the Malvinas is a sensitive issue for Argentines. Hence we 
must not allow a 'Malvinisation' of our foreign policy. We have an historic 
claim to the islands that we shall not waive. No Argentine government will 
abandon this claim. However, public opinion is fully aware that the main 
interest of Argentina, at this moment in our history, is economic partnership 
with our neighbours and membership of the global market. 
Yet the 'Malvinas paradox' exists. We have already seen how, for more 
than fifty years, one of our mistakes was to justify our isolation by the 
alleged or exaggerated existence of external hostilities. The suspicion was 
that imperialism or multinational companies had targeted Argentina and were 
responsible for our long decline. The general acceptance of this conspiracy 
theory freed us from the need to investigate whether or not our problems 
might be due to our own mistakes. The government of President Menem is 
confronting this attitude. We must regard the world as a place of 
opportunities and not as a source of hostility. 
The Malvinas paradox encapsulates this position of 'confrontation with a 
world that does not understand us' . The Malvinas issue was the perfect 
symbol of a bad relationship with the world at large. Nevertheless, since 
1833 six generations of Argentines have recognised the situation for what it 
is - an illegal and violent dispossession of national territory that lacks moral 
justification. Hence our claim has not wavered for a century and a half. 
Foreign aggression is unjustified but, as in the case of Malvinas, was real. 
And the consequences of that aggression still persist. Argentine governments 
of all persuasions - civilian and military - have attempted to find a solution 
to this continuing and painful- aspect of our relationship with Great Britain. 
We still await a reply from Britain. 
To caution against the dangers of 'Malvinising' our foreign policy in no 
way reduces the enormous importance the issue has nor the pain caused by 
the loss of many lives during the 1982 war. It should be perfectly clear that 
the Malvinas is a historical claim we will not give up. But it is equally clear 
that the challenge of today is to attract foreign investment, to integrate with 
our neighbours, to grow as a region and as societies with the strength 
necessary to combat hunger, disease, ignorance and the marginalisation of 
great sectors of our population. In short, to promote economic growth so as 
to resolve problems that result in part from previous mistaken social, 
economic, and foreign policy decisions. 
As to the dispute with the United Kingdom, our foreign policy strategy is 
based on the premise that the longer Argentina is seen as contributing to a 
process of stability and growth in the region, committed to a democratic 
system of government and clearly belonging to the Western Alliance, the 
greater the probability that our views will be heard. This is a way of 
highlighting not only our rights but also our authority and our determination 
to act in a co-operative and not in a hostile fashion. These sentiments lie at 
the core of our foreign policy. 
In 1989, when this administration took office, the aftermath of the 1982 
war was still evident, a war in which we were defeated. Notwithstanding the 
efforts made by the previous government, diplomatic relations with Great 
Britain had still not been re-established and levels of trade had dropped 
dramatically. Britain maintained a very restrictive maritime exclusion zone 
around the islands and was exploiting fishery resources without consulting or 
compensating Argentina in any way, and was preparing to do the same with 
gas and oil. Bad relations with Great Britain were also damaging our 
approach to the then European Community, a market in which Argentina was 
obviously interested in her own right. 
Within a short time advances had been made on several fronts and the 
following measures implemented: 
a) Normal diplomatic relations were reinstated, leaving the Malvinas 
islands dispute aside; 
b) The dispute was placed under the protection of a sovereignty 
umbrella, that promotes co-operation without affecting the claims of 
either party; 
c) Trade with Great Britain has reached normal levels and recently 
Britain has shown no unease regarding Argentine negotiations with the 
European Union; 
d) The movement of Argentine ships and aircraft in the maritime zone 
controlled by Great Britain has increased; 
e) We have coordinated fisheries policies allowing each party to exploit 
the resource, subject to the requirements of conservation, thereby 
generating an important income for Argentina; 
f) As to hydrocarbons, we have just signed an agreement that requires 
the approval of both Parliaments so that Great Britain, in actual 
possession of the territory, will not start exploiting these resources 
without the participation of Argentina; 
g) We have reiterated our respect for the interests of the islanders, as 
well as our traditional principle that the conflict is not with them but with 
Britain; 
h) We have strongly ratified our claims to sovereignty and, at the same 
time, proposed to Britain that the dispute should be settled in the best 
Western tradition: through co-operation, mutual respect and compliance 
with the law; 
i) Since 1965, Resolution 2065 of the United Nations General Assembly 
has urged Great Britain and Argentina to discuss the matter of 
sovereignty. Britain has chosen not to honour this request, but Argentina 
hopes that sooner or later Great Britain will remove all traces of 
imperialism from the South Atlantic so that Argentine rights may finally 
be accepted. 
In addition, we have recently included a clause in our National Constitution 
guaranteeing the inhabitants of the islands the right to preserve their way of 
life, the citizenship of their choice and to maintain their culture. 
Conclusion 
Frequently voiced accusations of 'automatic alliance' with the USA 
misinterpret the real aim of our foreign policy. This position is not taken for 
the benefit of third parties, but in the interests of Argentine sovereignty. The 
policy has been devised on the basis of what we consider to be our national 
interest in order to maximise benefits for our society as a whole. 
For practically fifty years the world considered Argentina a not very 
reliable country. The nation had flirted with the Axis powers and remained 
neutral for much of the Second World War, had acted enthusiastically in the 
Third World, had failed to consolidate democracy, seriously violated the 
human rights of its own citizens, had closed its markets and suffered from 
endemic and monumental inflation. If to this list we add the virtual civil war 
of the Proceso de Reconstruction National (1976-82) and the war waged 
against a foreign country in 1982, we will have a complete picture of the 
reasons why the world might not have regarded us as an organised 
community. 
For too long our governments pursued foreign policies that neglected the 
economic and social wellbeing of our people. The aim was 'prestige' and the 
strategy frequently jingoistic, an attitude favoured by the ruling elite which 
inevitably led to confrontations (with the United States, with our neighbours, 
and in time with Great Britain). These confrontations damaged our chances 
of social and economic development. This foreign policy ran in parallel with 
the economic model then in force. 
When our new economic policy was announced in 1991, it was dismissed 
as designed merely to please Washington and the International Monetary 
Fund. But the new strategy has been applied with such consistency - and has 
achieved decisive electoral approval - that today no sector of any importance 
proposes a different approach. MERCOSUR, Tlatelolco, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, privatisation, economic stability, alignment with the 
Western Alliance, the Brady plan and co-operation with our neighbours, all 
of this is part and parcel of a whole. All these actions, with different names, 
are inter-related and inter-dependent and show the consistency of a model that 
goes beyond economic and foreign policies. This model was continuously 
applied during one six-year presidential term and has recently received the 
support of the electorate which voted in favour of its continuation, with even 
a greater majority than in the previous presidential and congressional 
elections. With economic and political stability and policy consistency, 
Argentina is now a respected member of the world community. 
DEMOCRATISATION IN ARGENTINA AND THE END 
OF THE COLD WAR 
THE IMPACT ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS 
JOSE OCTAVIO BORDON 
The return of democracy in Argentina in 1983 changed the climate of 
bilateral relations and, although there was not at that point a re-establishment 
of diplomatic relationships, both tension and lack of mutual trust 
progressively diminished. In July 1984, the Berne Meeting took place. 
Argentina noted that the United Kingdom did not wish to discuss sovereignty, 
so progress was not possible in conversations about commercial, maritime, 
air transport or migration matters; that is, the only matters in which the 
United Kingdom was interested. The Argentine position was to agree to 
discuss other aspects only if sovereignty was part of the bilateral agenda - a 
position consistent with the historic stance of all Argentine governments. 
Argentina has only recently modified this position. 
Democratisation also led the Argentine political leadership to think about 
the error made by the military dictatorship in trying to recover effective 
jurisdiction over the islands by resorting to force. Although the policy of 
Prime Minister Thatcher was as much to blame for the war as that of General 
Galtieri, it became widely accepted in Argentina that there was no other 
method but diplomatic negotiation - which should never have been abandoned 
- and that it would take many years to repair the after-effects of a war that 
was as unfortunate as it was irrational. 
Those of us in Congress who followed the subject closely and took part in 
efforts to define the best policy to preserve Argentine interests, recall that 
period as one in which there were two main issues which could not change. 
First, the belief that the use of force by the United Kingdom in 1833, and the 
expulsion of the Argentine population, was the root cause of the dispute. This 
act invalidated the British presence in the islands and was the source of all 
future complications. Second the view that, despite the pragmatism of the 
Thatcher government which did not exclude relations with Argentina, the 
United Kingdom would not discuss sovereignty unless there was a substantial 
change in international power relations - inter-American, regional or 
bilateral - sufficient to offset the advantage of Britain remaining in the 
Malvinas. 
Re-establishing Relations with the United Kingdom: the cost to Argentina 
Modest advances recorded in bilateral relations between 1983 and 1989 -
almost exclusively commercial and financial - should not be disregarded. 
Diplomacy does not always mean positive and speedy results for one of the 
parties, especially if that party is placed in a position of relative weakness 
which hardly allows it to 'advance' without making concessions. 
Nevertheless, despite a relationship of polite formality, which was maintained 
by both President Alfonsin and Prime Minister Thatcher, the option of a 
resort to force was never completely excluded. Votes in the United Nations 
- broadly favourable to the Argentine position - and the tough response of the 
United Kingdom government to the Argentine decision to issue fishing 
permits in disputed waters, are landmarks that both illustrate and define this 
phase of relations between the two countries. 
But the international environment was changing. Globalisation, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the easing of the East-West conflict produced a different 
framework for the conduct of United Kingdom foreign policy, notably her 
special relationship with the United States of America and economic and 
social integration with her European partners. The process of change 
continues. The prospect of a 25-state Europe, sharing conceptual symmetries 
in political and economic terms, has also created a need for coordinated 
definition of foreign policy on a variety of issues, ranging from migration to 
nuclear power. In view of current problems confronting British and European 
leaders, it is probable that decolonisation will not be given a high priority, 
Nevertheless, I do not rule out the possibility that a broadening of democracy 
in Europe, the adoption of policies that promote public debate, and the 
increased participation of civil society in the process of decision-making 
could eventually give the Malvinas affair greater prominence. The 
contradiction between democracy and colonialism will become more obvious 
and this could provoke European Community (EU) organisations to exhort 
their British partner to re-consider present policy. 
From Conflict to Dialogue 
This said, by 1989 it was obvious that bilateral consultation had yielded few 
positive results. Although Argentina had returned to full democracy, and was 
about to hold the second democratic presidential and congressional election 
since the collapse of the military dictatorship, diplomatic relations had not 
been restored with the United Kingdom. A new phase in bilateral relations -
a transition from conflict to dialogue - began in August 1989 when 
representatives of the two countries met in New York. A second meeting in 
Madrid smoothed the way for the re-establishment of full, normal diplomatic 
relations. Bilateral discussions in the Spanish capital in February 1990 were 
significant because they demonstrated changes in the Argentine position and 
represented important achievements for the United Kingdom, 
In Madrid the United Kingdom obtained what had eluded her in Berne five 
years earlier. Namely, that the discussions should include all the issues in 
which Britain was interested, that is security, communications, trade, fishing, 
and consular relations, while at the same time excluding the issue of 
sovereignty from the bilateral agenda. This was the famous umbrella formula 
by which nothing that is said or done can be later used as a basis either in 
favour of or against Argentine or United Kingdom claims to sovereignty in 
the Malvinas, the South Georgias, the South Sandwich Islands and their 
respective maritime areas. This arrangement also entails recognising the 
British presence on the islands and implies deferring discussions about 
sovereignty for some considerable time. 
What did Argentina obtain from the application of the umbrella formula? 
There was a modest commendation for her willingness to increase contacts 
with the islanders - not that this was appreciated or reciprocated by the 
islanders themselves, despite the efforts of Foreign Minister Di Telia to 
foster goodwill. It is, however, equally true that in taking this step, Argentina 
re-entered a direct diplomatic dialogue with Great Britain, interrupted since 
April 1982, and this opened the door to the restoration of a varied and useful 
range of contacts and exchanges. Arguably, the restoration of conventional 
relations with the United Kingdom was part of a larger strategic shift in 
Argentine international relations under President Menem. The results of that 
change are evident today. It is equally evident that while the Argentine 
position has changed radically, the official British position has not. On the 
contrary, the position of the United Kingdom was strengthened by 
negotiations in Madrid and it remains even more determined to block any 
increase in the Argentine 'presence' in the South Atlantic or the Antarctic. 
An unquestionable example of this is the persistent refusal of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to accept Argentina's offer to provide a site for the 
Permanent Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty although there is support for 
the offer from all other treaty signatories. 
The second period came to an end in 1995 with another democratic 
presidential renewal in Argentina. It resulted in victory for the party in 
power. The 1995 elections marked yet another significant stage in the process 
of democratic consolidation. Most major parties contesting the elections 
expressed a commitment to reforms introduced since 1991, including 
privatisation and liberalisation of the economy, which have resulted in 
monetary stability. These reforms have led to an influx of foreign investment 
and enhanced relations with Europe. Britain is well represented in these 
developments: United Kingdom capital enters the country without restrictions 
and in full confidence. In addition, the electoral campaign witnessed the 
emergence of a confederation of parties - FREPASO (Frente del Pais 
Solidario) - which relegated the Radical Party (UCR) to third place in the 
presidential elections, and further signalled the growth of democratic 
pluralism in Argentina. It is also important to emphasise that the relationship 
with the UK did not play a major part in the electoral debate. 
Sustaining Progress: the need to discuss sovereignty 
In the United Kingdom, political horizons are influenced by the forthcoming 
general election, and the prospects of a Labour victory. Three fundamental 
debates are taking place in the pre-election period: security; Europe; and the 
relationship between society and the market. It thus seems logical to expect 
very few - if any - changes in bilateral relations from the British point of 
view; certainly there will be no concessions to Argentina that might cause 
problems for either the Conservative government or the opposition. 
These circumstances should not, however, preclude consideration of the 
future shape of Argentine foreign policy in relation to the United Kingdom. 
It is too easy to delay and defer serious consideration of this important issue. 
If general elections have not yet taken place in the United Kingdom, 
Argentina has already held presidential and congressional elections. Hence, 
from the Argentine side this is an appropriate moment to consider new 
initiatives. 
First, I think it is necessary to return to the concept of state policy, namely 
the formulation of a coherent policy agreed by the leaders and legislators of 
all major parties in Argentina. This policy should command widespread 
support in Congress, be consistent with our historic position and enjoy 
popular approval. Secondly, once that agreed policy has been devised, I think 
it will be essential to establish with the UK the necessity of maintaining and 
enlarging, both horizontally and vertically, the intense relations - ranging 
from cultural to commercial matters - that is nowadays taking place. And, 
within this framework, to reopen discussions on sovereignty. This should be 
done without pre-conditions, but with the seriousness that the nature of the 
problem and its history demand. 
In negotiations to date, the Menem administration has shown an excess of 
good will which has not been reciprocated by the UK. This has caused 
backward steps, such as an insistence that Argentina 'abandon her claims of 
sovereignty as a prerequisite for any rapprochement', to quote a recent 
statement by Richard Ralph, newly appointed British Governor of the islands. 
It is worth remembering here that it was a democratic and republican 
Argentine government that appointed the first Malvinas Governor. And it was 
the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Juan Ramon Balcarce, 
representing the Argentine Confederation, who in a note dated 22 January 
1833, issued through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Vicente de 
Maza, the first formal protest against the British military invasion. This note 
was presented only 19 days after the invasion actually took place. The 
democratic character of a young, recently independent country could not be 
set aside by the British parliament. No more can the present British 
government ignore the democratic nature of Argentina, a democracy nurtured 
and consolidated by successive freely contested elections since 1983. In this 
respect, the resort to force by Palmerston against the government of Balcarce 
cannot be validated by Galtieri's dictatorial adventure - unless it is argued 
that one action equalises another, which is inadmissible. 
For all these reasons, it is necessary to follow a path of good sense and 
rationality. In this context, the question of sovereignty need not become an 
insurmountable taboo (as some would have it). The history of Argentine-
British relations is rich in examples of the different ways this issue has been 
approached. For example, in 1965 United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution Number 2065 asked both Argentina and the United Kingdom to 
re-establish discussions aimed at resolving the conflict over sovereignty. In 
1967 the British Foreign Minister, George Brown, began conversations with 
his Argentine counterpart in New York, stating that his country was ready to 
concede sovereignty in return for the guarantee that the rights and the style 
of life of the inhabitants of the islands would be preserved. In November 
1968 Lord Chalfont launched an attempt to persuade the islanders of the 
advantages of a British-Argentine agreement on sovereignty. (Paradoxically, 
this is exactly what the Argentine government is trying to do today.) With 
Labour back in government in 1977, James Callaghan launched a new Peace 
Initiative, once again including sovereignty on the agenda. In November 1980 
Minister of State Nicholas Ridley - a member of the first Thatcher 
government - suggested to the islanders a lease-back formula. Among the 
British and Argentine leadership, some people are aware that in 1968 both 
Foreign Affairs Ministries, at officer level, wrote a memorandum of mutual 
understanding which included terms and conditions for a 'surrender' of 
sovereignty (or, as we would prefer to say, a 'devolution' of sovereignty). 
Clearly, there was no taboo about discussing sovereignty for the UK between 
1965 and 1982. Nor, as implied above, were there major differences of party 
policy over the question in Britain: rather, achieving a negotiated transfer of 
sovereignty was the objective of successive governments. 
Another basic fact that has to be brought out most clearly is the matter of 
the inhabitants of the island. They are a population which deserves our total 
respect and whose interests must be preserved with special care. It is, 
nevertheless, clear that they are an uprooted British population. In addition, 
the Island government applies a special prohibition against the settlement or 
even visit of Argentine citizens in the territories. This is something 
unimaginable in any other democratic country or territory. The rights of the 
islanders to defend their interests and guarantee their material, cultural and 
spiritual tranquillity must be respected. But these rights are not to be 
confused with bilateral issues of territorial integration and sovereignty. 
In this respect it is important to note that while there are barely two 
thousand Malvinas inhabitants, there are one hundred thousand British-
Argentines living in Argentina. Their well-being, culture, religion and 
interests have never needed any special protection. As for the Georgias or the 
Sandwich Islands, these territories are uninhabited. 
Moving Forward 
Those who have seen me engaging in Anglo-Argentine dialogues since 1983, 
or who remember me from the first visit of Argentine legislators to Britain 
after the war, or who came with me to the United Kingdom on trade missions 
when I was governor of the province of Mendoza, are well acquainted with 
my desire to look ahead in order to find peaceful solutions to the conflict. 
With good will on all sides - and without establishing any 'taboo' subjects -
it should be possible to face the problem and construct a truly strong and 
stable relationship. 
It is still possible to talk in terms of the 'umbrella', but this should not be 
a leaky instrument through which British jurisdiction and dominion constantly 
permeate. Rather the umbrella must be a protective device that covers a 
complete, discrete, patient and continuous dialogue about all relevant issues, 
not least sovereignty. In this way, bilateral relations can be extended and 
enriched. The umbrella must be a dynamic mechanism - responsive to 
changing circumstances - not something that serves as a negative safeguard, 
limiting progress. 
It would be a mistake to re-start conversations about the conflict, 
approaching it as a compact and indivisible problem. On the contrary, the 
core issue can be divided in two main topics: 
1. Territorial sovereignty, which means the exercise of effective 
jurisdiction by a state over a territorial, aerial and maritime space, or, 
to employ the language of International Law, the 'Scope of Spatial 
Validity' concept. 
2. The status of the inhabitants of those spaces, including the applicable 
law, civil guarantees, the legal and juridical order, and the 
administrative system. 
An itemised approach, such as this, could generate a workable agenda for 
conversations under a true umbrella. 
Although some stubbornly deny that there is a problem, this will not make 
it disappear. Those who believe that by postponing serious negotiations about 
sovereignty, the issue will blur as time passes (this seems to be the British 
position) or that the islanders will finally be convinced of the advantages of 
becoming Argentine citizens (the present position of the Menem 
administration), are mistaken. History cautions against complacency. 
Hitherto, there have been periods of relative quietude but there have also 
been moments of intense protest and threats of action, for example, in 1880, 
1945 and 1982 (although open hostilities only occurred in 1982). Hence, it 
is essential to seize the initiative during a period of positive relations between 
the two governments and at an historic global conjuncture. 
As a Latin American nation, and as part of MERCOSUR, Argentina has 
embarked upon major negotiations with the European Union. The rapid 
proliferation in interregional relations is possible largely as a result of 
common economic interests and cultural coincidence, but is also propelled 
forward because it is a dialogue among democratic countries. Argentina 
wishes to find with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and all the rest of her 
partners, a new place in a prosperous world in association with other 
democracies that share a similar global view - namely, a civilised and safe 
democratic order built up in close association with the European Union. 
The experience of the fairly recent past demonstrates that unilateral politics 
lead to tension and conflict. Conversely, open, democratic regional politics 
of consensus promote serious discussion about all problems among all 
sectors. For Argentina, both paths, the European and the Latin American, are 
converging and strengthening tendencies in favour of democratic institution-
building and international economic integration. This convergence provides 
a new opportunity for a re-examination of bilateral issues. 
If both Argentina and the United Kingdom decide to devote intelligence, 
creativity and good will during these years of shared democracy to solve 
matters of maritime and air security, to carry out family visits, engage in 
investment, commerce and fishing, why, then, cannot we all devote the same 
determination and dedication to finding a solution for this problem that has 
already lasted for more than a century and a half? The United Kingdom and 
Argentina are members of a changing international community in which 
political institutions are becoming stronger and more democratic and in which 
civil society is increasing its control of governments and leaders. This is the 
moment for initiative and imagination, not least as regards the debate about 
the status of the islands. 

BRITAIN, ARGENTINA AND THE ISLANDS 
THE POTENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION 
ALASTAIR FORSYTH 
My interest in the Falklands began in April 1982 when I was the 
representative in Venezuela of a London-based international banking group. 
I had spent nearly five years building up a business. It looked as though, 
unbelievably, it well might come to an end because of a quarrel in the South 
Atlantic about a group of almost uninhabited islands. I came to realise firstly 
the passion behind the Argentine commitment to the recovery of the islands 
(astonishingly even Argentines exiled in Caracas instantly supported the 
actions of General Galtieri) and secondly the instinctive support of other 
Latin Americans, not least the Venezuelans, for the Argentine cause. 
Like most Britons I had very little knowledge of the Falklands but was 
quite clear that they were British, and that any Argentine claim must be 
trivial. Britain was no longer a colonial power: the only important remaining 
colonies were Gibraltar and the Falklands, whose inhabitants did not wish to 
change their status. This seemed for Britain an entirely honourable position 
and fully in compliance with the principles of the United Nations charter. 
Hence the surprise and shock that other Latin American nations should 
support Argentina; to the extent that it looked as though all British business 
with Venezuela would cease. Wishing to bring this to the attention of those 
back home I wrote to The Times to say beware; and was promptly branded a 
traitor. Convinced that sense rather than passion should prevail, I became an 
active participant at every meeting of the Argentine British Conference 
(ABC). 
The Geographical, Economic and Historical Context 
Some observations about the geography of the problem are needed. The 
Falklands comprise two large islands, East and West Falkland, and a cluster 
of smaller islands. The area of the islands is approximately 12,200 square 
kilometres, tiny in relation to Argentina's 2,780.000 square kilometres but 
larger for example than the sovereign states of Jamaica, 11,000 square 
kilometres, and Cyprus, 9,250 square kilometres. The total population is 
about 2,000 - equivalent in size to a large English village or small town. 
Approximately three quarters of the population live in the capital, Stanley, 
located on East Falkland, so that only 500 or so populate the rest of the 
territory. In addition to this 'ordinarily resident' population there is a floating 
population of some 2,000 military personnel. These have their base at Mount 
Pleasant, 56 kilometres from the capital. 
Apart from the Falklands there are two other territories caught up in the 
dispute. They are the islands that used to be called the Falkland Island 
Dependencies and Antarctica. The former dependencies (now British 
Dependent Territories) comprise South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands, the latter including the South Orkneys. Both groups were discovered 
and claimed for Britain by Captain Cook in 1775. They were formerly 
whaling bases, but are now uninhabited except for a small garrison in South 
Georgia. It is generally accepted that the British claim to these territories is 
stronger than its claim to the Falklands. 
Antarctica, further to the South, constitutes nine percent of the world land-
mass, slightly larger than the old USSR and double the area of Europe. 
Britain claims a major wedge of Antarctica. So do Argentina and Chile whose 
claims compete with the British. Other major claimants are Australia, New 
Zealand and Norway, while many others, including the United States, 
France, Germany and Russia have lesser claims. The Antarctic Treaty signed 
in 1959 brought a halt to the process of claim and counterclaim. This 
landmark treaty brought into being the concept of suspension of sovereignty, 
the 'sovereignty umbrella', adopted by Britain and Argentina as the basis for 
the resumption of relations in 1989. It is a popular misconception that the 
British claim to Antarctica somehow depends on British ownership of the 
Falklands and their former dependencies. This is not the case. However, all 
the territories provide rights to territorial waters and it must be remembered 
that distances in the South West Atlantic area are enormous. 
For many years the economy and population of the Falklands were 
declining. A new source of income was derived from the establishment in 
February 1987 of a fishing zone and the issue of fishing licences. This zone 
coincided with the 150 mile Falkland Island Protection Zone (FIPZ) 
established by Britain in July 1982. This has since been extended to 200 
miles, the international norm for territorial waters and the same as the 
Argentine limit. The mobility of the fish population, no respecter of marine 
boundaries, and the uncontrolled fishing activities of fleets from all over the 
world, forced Britain, Argentina and the Islands to cooperate in defence of 
a common resource. A working group on fisheries met in December 1989 and 
talks have continued since then. It has not always been easy to agree on 
fishing strategies year by year for lack of agreement on basic conservation 
principles. Following the Menem-Major meeting in New York in 1995 both 
sides are now working on long-term guidelines to facilitate agreement on 
shorter term strategies, such as setting limits for the annual catch. 
As a result of licensing fees the Falklands government revenue multiplied 
sevenfold between 1984 and 1992 to £42 million. Fishing income has since 
declined somewhat to a level of about £17 million in the 94/95 financial year. 
This compares with an annual cost of £67 million for the British military 
defence of the Falklands, to which at present the government of the Islands 
makes no direct contribution. The increase in Falklands government revenue 
has been applied mainly to some modest development projects in the areas of 
education, health, transport and communications. 
Turning briefly to history, little needs to be said of the period before 3 
January 1833. This was the date on which two British naval vessels arrived 
to claim the islands and expelled the handful of settlers of various 
nationalities who had arrived under the protection of an Argentine nominated 
Governor. The takeover was effected without violence, although some 
Argentines are under the impression that this was a bloody encounter, and 
that the settlers were deported in chains. 
The history of claim and counterclaim prior to 1833 is obscure, uncertain 
and of the utmost triviality, a matter of who first sighted or landed on the 
islands, how long they stayed, what they did when they left, and what their 
respective governments did to claim or negotiate away or buy back the 
territory. What is certain is that from 1833 Britain occupied and administered 
the islands. Argentina issued a formal protest and has maintained this position 
since. Britain rejected these protests. Subsequently, in the early 1840s, 
General Rosas offered the islands to Britain in return for the cancellation of 
the 1825 Barings Loan. The offer was not accepted. 
The United Nations Charter established in 1946 the aim of decolonisation 
(and the Falklands remain today a British colony), but it also established the 
principle of the self-determination of peoples. Argentina claims that the 
Falkland Islanders are an implant not a people. The islanders reply that a high 
proportion of the population are third or fourth or fifth generation 
inhabitants. This is a much higher proportion than in Argentina and what are 
the European settlers in Argentina if not an implant? 
The war occurred in 1982 because there had been no movement at all in the 
British position, despite a UN call for Britain and Argentina to settle their 
differences. The military regime in power since 1976 used the excuse of 
Argentine frustration to resort to arms. This small-scale action in the South 
West Atlantic became a crisis of international proportions. Passions ran high, 
more than a thousand lives were lost and the dispute was transformed. It took 
seven and a half years until October 1989 for the two countries to establish 
a basis for normalising relationships and another six months before the 
respective embassies re-opened. 
The formula for the re-establishment of relationships was that they should 
be conducted under a sovereignty umbrella. The formula has proved 
extremely successful. But Argentina, with considerable patience so far, 
recognising, as one diplomat put it, that 'we blew it in 1982', waits for the 
folding of the umbrella and the recovery of sovereignty. An amendment to 
the Argentine constitution in 1994 reaffirms the claim. It includes a new 
'transitional' clause ratifying Argentina's 'legitimate and imprescriptible 
sovereignty' over the Falklands and, be it noted, the South Georgia and South 
Sandwich islands, these territories being an integral part of Argentina's 
national territory. The clause also states that the recovery of these territories 
and 'the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of their 
inhabitants and according to the principles of International law' (i.e. without 
resort to force) constitutes 'a permanent and unrenounceable objective of the 
Argentine people'. This is a hard clause to grapple with for those who seek 
a compromise solution. 
Diplomatic Relations and the Exploitation of Natural Resources 
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were re-established in July 
1989. President Menem initiated a totally new phase in Argentine foreign 
policy and the resumption of relationships with Britain was one of the first 
results. Relationships continued to improve and reached a high point early in 
Menem's second term with the September 1995 oil agreement and the 
subsequent meeting of President Menem and Prime Minister Major in 
October 1995 in New York. Oil and gas development in and around the 
Islands is now central to the Argentine-British relationship and therefore 
needs examining in some detail. 
At the time of the 1982 war it was alleged by some commentators that 
Britain's real interest in the islands was their hydrocarbon potential. This was 
then an extremely remote possibility and hardly affected the decisions that led 
to war. Since then the prospect has become less remote. Seismic exploration 
after 1993 confirmed many of the necessary conditions for the existence and 
extractability of oil and gas. This is a long way from proving that there are 
indeed reserves of oil and/or gas, and if there are, that they are large enough 
and accessible enough to justify commercial extraction. In 1994 the British 
Geological Survey, a non-governmental organisation hired by the Falklands 
Islands Government, reported on seismic tests. The press interpretation was 
that reserves could exceed those of the North Sea. In fact what the spokesman 
said was that the area where reserves might exist was 25 percent larger than 
the North Sea oil and gas area, rather a different matter. 
On the basis of the British Geological Survey report, the Falkland Islands 
Government decided to proceed to the next stage and to invite bids for 
exploration and exploitation licences. Two areas were designated, one to the 
North and one to the South of the islands, both within the FIPZ, the area 
claimed by the Falkland Islands as its territorial waters. The Falkland Islands 
Government set 3 October 1995 for the opening of the bidding round. 
Prospective bidders faced two kinds of risk, economic and political. The 
economic risks are complex enough. Bidders have to calculate what it is 
worth spending to explore the concessions they may be able to obtain. How 
much will the process of exploration cost? What are the probabilities that oil 
and gas will be found in exploitable quantities? How long will it take? What 
will be the level of prices if or when oil or gas is found? Which markets will 
be accessible and how much will exploitation and transport cost? The political 
risks are evident enough to the British, Argentine and Falkland governments. 
The message from oil and gas companies is that unless a stable political and 
legal framework for exploration and exploitation can be devised, there will 
be little commercial interest. 
Falkland islanders, encouraged by the British Geological Survey reports, 
were keen to press ahead. They saw the prospect of another source of wealth 
for a community that had become moderately prosperous from its fishing 
income, but recognised that this source was volatile. They must also have 
seen that proceeding with oil and gas exploration would be a test of British 
and Argentine attitudes on sovereignty, perhaps hoping to force Britain to 
stand firm. Pressure from the islanders placed Britain and Argentina on a 
collision course. Negotiations continued throughout 1994 and 1995. By 
August of 1995 matters looked serious. The Falklanders had set a date for the 
opening of the licensing round; Britain could not easily halt the process; and 
a bill had been presented to the Argentine Congress proposing an embargo on 
any oil or gas company which participated in the bidding process and did not 
agree to pay a royalty of three per cent to Argentina. 
There was a strong desire on the British side to reach an agreement. And 
it was no time for Argentina to be taking an apparently confrontational and 
intransigent position. Argentina was on a financial knife edge in the difficult 
months that succeeded the Mexican financial collapse in December 1994 and 
badly needed to maintain the confidence of the international financial 
community. The agreement when it emerged was far from precise. It was 
entitled 'Joint Declaration: Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South 
West Atlantic' and dated New York, 27 September 1995. The agreement was 
generally welcomed, not least by the United States of America, the European 
Union, and Chile, and the international financial community. The Joint 
Declaration was a turning point. If agreement had not been reached, the 
improvement in relations might have suddenly reversed. We might have had 
a crisis on our hands. 
What did the agreement amount to? First, the Argentine Government 
effectively withdrew its opposition to the bidding process; both sides agreed 
to cooperate to encourage offshore activities in the South West Atlantic. 
Secondly a Joint Argentine-British Commission was to be set up to further 
cooperation and to manage oil and gas developments in two 'areas of special 
cooperation', namely areas that straddled the demarcation line between 
Argentine and Falkland territorial waters. 
Unfortunately, the agreement did not explicitly address the question of 
royalties, that is payments of a percentage of the value of any oil or gas 
ultimately produced, payments quite distinct from rental for the concession 
areas and tax on corporate activities. The level of royalties is of crucial 
importance to bidders. In the bidding documents the rate of royalty to be paid 
to the Falkland Islands Government is nine per cent. A bill presented to the 
Argentine Congress in 1995 stated that any company which entered into the 
bidding process and did not agree to pay a three per cent royalty to the 
Argentine Government would be embargoed from operating in Argentina. 
This bill was approved by the Senate, but was not put to the Deputies. A 
revised bill will probably be presented to Congress in 1996. The principal 
amendments are likely to include technical changes required to make certain 
aspects of the hydrocarbon law more flexible (e.g. with respect to royalties, 
now set at a standard 15 per cent), but will maintain the requirement that a 
royalty is paid to Argentina by companies operating in the Falklands area. 
Will the revised bill be passed into law? Will oil companies be prepared to 
pay the double royalty? The total of 12 per cent (that is, 9 per cent to the 
Falklands and 3 per cent to Argentina) is not by industry standards excessive. 
What repercussions will the double royalty have on the sovereignty issue? 
Will the three per cent payment to Argentina remain for as long as necessary 
as an acceptable political insurance premium? What if oil or gas is found in 
massive quantities in the Falklands area? Will Argentina be content with only 
three per cent? And what if no Argentine companies are successful in the 
bidding rounds? There is no guarantee that any will be: but if matters are 
handled elegantly Britain and the Falkland Islands could ensure both 
Argentine participation in exploitation and Argentine tax revenues from 
onshore activities in Argentina. So far matters are being handled with great 
sensitivity, but there is plenty of scope for serious challenges to good 
relations to arise. 
In the meantime, following the agreement, the Falkland Islands 
Government, which accepted the terms of the agreement despite the 
concessions to Argentina, proceeded to open the licensing round on 3 October 
1995. It is anticipated that awards will be made in early July 1996. Successful 
bidders will then begin to mobilise resources for the first drillings on the 
ocean bed. A number of companies have already shown interest, notably YPF 
of Argentina and British Gas of the UK, who have agreed in principle to 
work together. 
But there are areas of abrasion. The agreement states that one of the 
functions of the Joint Commission is to encourage commercial activities in 
the Areas of Special Cooperation 'by means such as joint ventures and 
consortia from the two sides'. However in the document introducing the 
October 1995 licensing round, the Falklands Islands Government makes it 
clear that 'whilst the participation of Argentine oil companies is welcomed 
and considered desirable ... it is unlikely that an award would be made to any 
applicant group comprising more than 49 per cent Argentine interests or with 
an Argentine registered operator'. It is also pointed out later in the document 
that 'Persons travelling on Argentine passports are not permitted to land in 
the Falkland Islands'. 
These two statements should modify a little the euphoria about the Joint 
Declaration. At least the Falkland Islands Government has conceded that 
Argentine companies may participate in exploration and exploitation of the 
Falkland Island concession areas and the Argentine Government will not 
obstruct their participation; and in the Areas of Special Cooperation 
Argentine-British joint ventures are encouraged; but there are still blocks to 
Argentine involvement in the Falkland waters which Argentina claims. 
The development process is under way. The Falkland Islands government 
has opened the licensing round in relation to blocks within Falkland Island 
territorial waters. The Argentine Government has issued licences for the oil 
and gas concessions in the area on the Argentine side of the Argentine-
Falkland maritime boundary, outside the terms of the agreement. The Joint 
Commission is working towards the opening of a licensing round for the 
Areas of Special Cooperation that straddle this boundary. The Joint 
Committee, now named the Joint South West Atlantic Hydrocarbons 
Committee, is likely to have its first formal meeting shortly and may be ready 
to invite bids by the end of 1996. 
Achieving a Permanent Solution 
Does this offer the potential for a lasting solution, not least in the likely event 
of a resurgence of the sovereignty question? There is reason to suppose that 
some form of solution to the sovereignty problem might be achievable by the 
end of President Menem's second term. Oil and gas provide the pressure and 
other conditions are not unfavourable. 
First, time continues to heal. Fourteen years have passed since the war. 
Secondly, old relationships have been restored and new contacts established. 
Bilateral trade has grown rapidly since the resumption of relations in 1989 as 
has British direct and indirect investment in Argentina. Politically, through 
step by step development of contacts, with an accumulation of visits by 
Argentine and British ministers, by representatives of congress and 
parliament and by members of the British royal family, the passions of war 
have subsided and rational interchange has again become possible. To this 
process the diplomats on both sides have made an impressive contribution, 
handling matters with great sensitivity at each stage. 
The series of Argentine-British conferences, beginning in April 1990, have 
made a parallel contribution. In a low profile way they have provided a forum 
where Argentines and British, and on the last three occasions Islanders also, 
could exchange views privately in a way that would have been impossible in 
public. The influence of the conferences has percolated widely, extending 
rational debate and providing an indicator of how new attitudes were 
beginning to evolve. Yet it is too early to be very optimistic. The conferences 
have indicated the beginnings of change, but have also shown how 
intractable, even among men and women of good will, the Falklands problem 
is. 
On all sides there is a recognition that more time - possibly decades - may 
be needed to repair the damage of war and that the utmost sensitivity 
continues to be required in handling the issue in order to avoid inflaming 
public opinion which might result in deadlock. But what kind of movement 
is possible in the near future? The British Government position is quite clear: 
the islands are sovereign British territory. Nor is there a noticeable difference 
between the attitudes of the two principal parties. As one British ex-Cabinet 
minister put it brutally and undiplomatically: 'the Argentines have got to get 
it into their thick heads that the islands are British'. Equally clear is the 
Argentine position, reiterated every year at the United Nations: the islands 
are Argentine, seized by Britain as a colonising power, and must be returned. 
Neither position is sustainable. It is significant that both sides have refused 
to submit the matter to arbitration. This must mean that neither side is 
confident of its own case. 
In the circumstances neither side can reasonably insist on obtaining all that 
it claims, without modification or compromise. If this is recognised then the 
sooner a solution is produced the better. Already there has been one war, 
whose consequences linger on. Oil and gas could lead to another collision. 
However, the case for compromise is not yet publicly recognised on either 
side. Hence one important policy objective for the governments of Argentina, 
Britain and the Falklands must be to help disseminate among their peoples a 
proper and less partisan understanding of the position of each of the parties, 
and to discourage the propagation of the extreme unqualified nationalist case. 
It is interesting that at the last Argentine-British Conference the 
businessmen, as opposed to the politicians, were unanimously in favour of 
pragmatic compromise. Businessmen are perhaps more used to the need to 
achieve pragmatic and less than perfect solutions. And to them the position 
of Britain and Argentina in the Falklands case looks archaic ('tribal' was one 
description used). 
Is some kind of sharing possible? In principle yes. The devil is in the 
detail. If it is accepted that both sides have a legitimate claim, the solution 
should allow the two countries to retain a permanent interest in the islands. 
A popular solution at one time was 'sale and leaseback': that is, for Britain 
to sell the islands to Argentina, and for Argentina to lease the islands back to 
a British administration. The lease would be for a finite period - say, fifty or 
a hundred years - after which the islands would be wholly Argentine and 
administered by Argentina. This solution prior to the war came close to 
acceptance. It could have been combined with a range of guarantees to make 
the transfer to Argentina at the end of the lease period more palatable to the 
islanders, guarantees on such matters as law and policing and the election of 
councillors. The war changed the situation. There is now a stronger British 
commitment to the islands - a price having been paid in lives - and this 
commitment is further strengthened by the prospect of oil or gas. In any 
event, going back to first principles, if both sides are entitled to a permanent 
interest in the islands, 'sale and leaseback' is inappropriate. Permanency of 
interest condemns the two sides to some form of co-ownership or co-
sovereignty. 
The possible mechanics of co-ownership are sketched out in an excellent 
pamphlet by Martin Dent: 'Shared Sovereignty: a solution for the 
Falklands/Malvinas dispute'. Dent's paper now needs some updating, but its 
central recommendations hold good and provide a rational structure for the 
settlement of the dispute. A joint Argentine-British committee would 
nominate a governor who would preside over an elected legislative council. 
Matters of defence and foreign policy would be determined by the joint 
committee and all domestic matters would be decided by the legislative 
council. Two flags could fly, or three, or perhaps just one, a new Falkland 
flag representing the islands and the two protecting powers. My only 
criticism of Dent's scheme is that he assumes it would be an interim 
arrangement. There is no reason why the system might not be continued 
indefinitely. Co-dominion has worked elsewhere: why preclude or prejudge 
that possibility in the Falklands/Malvinas? 
It is worth considering how this system of co-dominion or shared-
ownership might function with respect to offshore oil or gas. If offshore areas 
were the responsibility of the Joint Argentine-British Committee then it 
would be the task of the Committee to decide on development policy and set 
the terms for exploration and exploitation. The Joint Committee could act like 
a sovereign government and either content itself with tax revenues from the 
oil and gas activity in the Falklands or exact a royalty itself or leave this to 
the regional or provincial authority, in this case the legislative council. 
If on the other hand the offshore areas came under the jurisdiction of the 
legislative council it would be for the council to conduct itself in the same 
way as the Falkland Islands government has done, arranging for the bidding 
process fixing the fee and expecting to benefit in full from the proceeds; but 
also taking advice from outside, from the sovereign power(s) and from 
independent agencies. As it does not seem appropriate for the Joint 
Committee to be a taxing authority, as this could embroil the committee too 
deeply in politics, it would seem better for the entire concessioning process 
to be left in the hands of the legislative council, although some kind of veto 
powers might be reserved in the co-dominion treaty for the Committee. 
Further speculation about the mechanics of a shared sovereignty is not 
necessary at this stage. It is a matter best left to those knowledgeable in the 
drafting and operation of constitutions. However some final comment is 
needed on how to get from here - where sovereignty is above the umbrella 
- to there, namely some form of shared sovereignty solution. 
Sovereignty: the way forward 
It is a nice idea that reason might prevail, and that negotiators briefed by the 
two governments should instruct officials to produce a comprehensive shared 
sovereignty proposal, which, once agreed, the governments would sanction. 
This is difficult to envisage. However if there was a growing recognition that 
the problem will not disappear; that it might again escalate; that neither side 
has right exclusively on its side; and that the moment may be propitious for 
another attempt at a solution; then the two governments might agree that a 
strong case for a compromise solution could be put to the general public in 
both countries. 
This indeed is a challenge for President Menem's second term. He and his 
ministers have already achieved an enormous amount in normalising and 
reconstructing the Argentine-British relationship. President Menem has 
repeatedly stated his belief, which he describes as intuitive, that Argentina 
will in one way or another, by peaceful means recover sovereignty over the 
islands by the year 2000. And in one remark, in Switzerland in 1992, he is 
reported to have said that one solution to the problem of sovereignty might 
be for two flags to fly. Nothing more was heard of this suggestion and one 
suspects that it was instantly buried by the professional diplomats more 
concerned at that time with protecting Argentina's negotiating position than 
promoting imaginative solutions. 
However, some form of the 'two flag' solution is the most likely way 
forward. One significant change in the years since the war has been the 
maturing of the Falkland Islanders. For the first time in history they have had 
to take on responsibility for their own destinies and increasingly have had to 
take on a role internationally, in presenting their political case and promoting 
interest in Falklands oil and gas. Lewis Clifton, an islander, described this 
change as 'Falklandisation'. It is no longer a question of 'Keep the Falkland 
Islands British' but of 'Keep the Falkland Islands for the Falkland Islanders'. 
This points the way to a protectorate kind of solution, with Britain and 
Argentina being the joint (sovereign?) protecting powers of the Falkland way 
of life. It is inconceivable that with their tiny 2000 population the Falkland 
Islands could be an independent state, but a protectorate would be some way 
towards this. 
A protectorate is a variant of the shared sovereignty solution. It would 
entail joint Argentine-British defence of the islands. This might in time entail 
a joint Argentine-British military presence on the island. And a joint 
Argentine-British presence at the Mount Pleasant base would allow two flags 
to fly there at least. 
On the British side a new government will be in place by May 1997. 
Perhaps it will be a new government prepared to take a chance. Even the 
present government might see a way of winning credit for another peace-
making initiative, necessarily involving compromise. Perhaps this is too 
optimistic. More likely change will only come after another crisis breaks. If 
the wit of problem-solvers cannot find a route to the negotiating table, it may 
be business pressures to exploit oil or gas that finds a way. This will be more 
stressful, but perhaps more effective. In the meantime satisfaction can be 
taken from the fact that already there is a working agreement on fish, the 
beginnings of an agreement on the development of oil and gas, and a long-
standing arrangement for the exchange of information on naval, military and 
air force movements in the South West Atlantic area. 
This patchwork of agreements must be extended: to add another on 
communications and another on defence, and ultimately stitch them together 
into a single permanent shared-sovereignty umbrella over the Falklands. The 
islanders might be the strongest opponents of any such deal: but I have heard 
at least one of them say that the only deal with Argentina they could ever 
contemplate was one that permanently secured their independent future. This 
might be it. 

